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Abstract: When parents are more educated, their children tend to receive
more schooling as well. Does this occur because parental ability is passed on
genetically or because more educated parents provide a better environment
for children to ﬂourish? Using an intergenerational sample of families, we
estimate on the basis of a comparison of biological and adopted children that
about 65 to 80 percent of the parental ability is genetically transmitted.
1 Introduction
Many studies show that children raised by highly educated parents receive
more schooling than children raised by less educated parents. However,
the notion that education is persistent across generations does not neces-
sarily imply that education itself is the driving factor behind this family
connection. Other potential factors are inheritance of ability, more favor-
able academic environment, higher aspirations, or better access to ﬁnancial
resources.
The economics literature examines this family connection with models
where the educational attainment of children is regarded as the outcome
of a family decision making process that links parental resources and chil-
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1dren outcomes through human capital investments. These models support
the empirical observation that more family income, earned on average by
highly educated parents, stimulate further schooling (Becker and Tomes,
1986; reviewed by Haveman and Wolfe, 1995).
Sociologists have presented considerable empirical and theoretical evi-
dence on the relation between the incomes and education levels of parents
and children. Their various theories reﬂect on ways that might determine
educational mobility. Cultural reproduction theory, for example, claims
that education serves as the main reproductive channel for intergenerational
status transmission (Collins, 1971; Niehoﬀ and Ganzeboom, 1996). Mod-
ernization theory, on the other hand, suggests that parental income and
command over resources are responsible forces underpinning the intergener-
ational transfers (Blau and Duncan, 1967).
In their widely debated book The Bell Curve Herrnstein and Murray
(1994) argue that it is ability measured as IQ that matters. Highly edu-
cated parents have more ability on average than less educated parents. If
ability is transmitted from parents to children, education turns out to be
persistent across generations. Furthermore, not only are high ability parents
highly educated, they also generate more income. If family income matters
for educational achievement, ability eﬀects run through income as well. Al-
together, Herrnstein and Murray claim that it is nature rather than nurture
that explains educational persistence across generations.2
This paper aims to unravel the ability factors behind this family connec-
tion using the intergenerational mobility model of human capital proposed
by Becker and Tomes (1986). We show how ability, family income and ed-
ucation move across generations, and we show what happens to mobility of
human capital if we embrace the idea that part of ability is hereditary.
To fulﬁll this ambitious plan, we explore a unique US dataset, the Wis-
consin Longitudinal Survey (WLS), that contains very detailed multigener-
ational information about households. Data collection started in 1957 on a
group of 16 years old high school students in the American state of Wis-
consin. Information was gathered about their IQ, family background, and
so on. In 1964, 1975 and 1992 the same students were contacted again and
information was collected about their school careers, labor market status,
2Herrnstein and Murray (1994) have been widely criticized by, to name a few
economists, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1999), Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil (1998), Gold-
berger and Manski (1995), Korenman and Winship (1995). If we only consider the empir-
ical analysis, the main gist of the critique is that IQ is an important but not a dominant
factor in predicting economic and social success.
2family conditions and the school careers of their children. To shed light
on the importance of the heritability of ability, we use information whether
these children are their parents’ own oﬀspring as opposed to adopted chil-
dren. We shall further assume that ability is wholly determined by IQ. Plug,
van Praag and Hartog (1999) already point to the fact that ability as such is
only incompletely measured but for now it serves as an interesting starting
point for the exercise to be developed in this paper.
Our empirical analysis consists of three parts. Firstly, we estimate a
base model that focuses on the well-established fact of educational transfers
between parents and children. The human capital estimates of this model
do not suﬀer from ability bias as we include an explicit proxy for ability
measured as IQ test scores. Secondly, we determine whether family income
matters for human capital transmissions. Note that no clear answer is found
by simply adding family income to the list of our variables since pure hu-
man capital and ability eﬀects may run through income as well. What we
do is we estimate that part of income that is arguably generated by luck
and we include this variable in our analysis. We then track down the school
performance of children whose parents experienced random income shocks
to see whether income truly matters. Thirdly, we evaluate Herrnstein and
Murray’s hypothesis. We consider the mobility eﬀects of ability and intro-
duce a mechanism to disentangle persistence eﬀects caused by nature and
nurture.
Economists have studied ability determinants of educational attainment
and found that smarter students likely obtain more schooling, but these
studies have mostly skirted the nature/nurture debate. A few recent ex-
ceptions are Behrman and Taubman (1989), and Behrman, Rosenzweig and
Taubman (1994) who use correlations between relatives and twins to decom-
pose nature from nurture eﬀects. Their models merely focus on inequality
of opportunity from which they conclude that schooling is mostly in the
genes.3 The present study has various advantages over former approaches.
The ﬁrst advantage lies in the level of abstraction. Former studies use vari-
ance decomposition to infer information on whether nature or nurture is the
determining factor in describing inequality in human capital. This infor-
mation is rather abstract as it only reﬂects relative contributions to R2. In
contrast, we estimate which part of ability is inherited and which part can be
attributed to the environment. In doing so we decompose ability eﬀects in
3Goldberger (1979) argues that their framework puts the emphasis on genes rather
than environment.
3the more concrete form of regression slopes. The second advantage concerns
the ﬂexibility in the role of income. Our study does not treat income as an
explicit environmental variable. Rather, it models ability transfers in a way
that allows ability eﬀects to run through income as well. The ﬁnal advan-
tage is one of focus. The economics literature thus far uses information on
twins and relatives to isolate a genetic transmission mechanism. We apply
information on adopted children to isolate the environmental transmission
mechanism. Notice that the two models are complementary: both intend to
describe the same intergenerational phenomena. Thus, it is interesting to
have a well-developed parallel set of ﬁndings.4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 intro-
duces the model describing the relation between school choices and family
background. In Section 3 we brieﬂy discuss the econometric ramiﬁcations.
Section 4 describes the data from the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey in
more detail. Section 5 presents and discusses our empirical ﬁndings. In
Section 6 we examine the robustness of our nature and nurture estimates.
Finally, Section 7 summarizes our conclusions.
The main conclusion of the paper is that parental ability measured as
IQ is a dominating factor in explaining the children’s school success. Yet,
even if high ability parents do stimulate their children’s human capital, a
portion of the transmission channel runs through parental education and
family income as well. Thus, if we decompose the ability transfers from
parent to child into a genetic and environmental component, we ﬁnd that
about 65 to 80 percent of the ability eﬀect relevant for school achievement
is determined by nature. Nurture does not play a dominant role.
2 The model
The mobility of human capital is modeled akin to Becker and Tomes (1986),
with the exception that this model considers the transmission of human
capital instead of income. If t indexes generations, family income yt−1 is
generated by human capital ht−1, ability et−1 and market luck ut−1. This
relation is written as
yt−1 = a0 + a1ht−1 + a2et−1 + ut−1 (2.1)
4The idea to use adopted children to measure the diﬀerence between the environmental
and genetic inﬂuence of family background is not new. Sociologists Scarr and Weinberg
(1978) estimated the genetic component in IQ transfers to be 40 to 70 percent using a
very small and selective sample.
4Contrary to market luck u which is assumed not to be transmitted from
parent to child, ability e transfers from parent to child through genes and
culture. We assume the following relation
et = b0 + b1et−1 + vt (2.2)
where v is a non-structural component of ability. Based on maximizing
behavior, parents invest in human capital of their children. As a result,
family income and individual ability are the ingredients of the children’s
human capital function
ht = c0 + c1yt−1 + c2et + wt (2.3)
Like v,w is considered random variation. The disturbances u,v and w have
zero means and are assumed to be temporally uncorrelated.5
Identiﬁcation of the model requires data for several generations on a
large number of families, all under constant conditions. To this end, we use
a dataset with information on human capital of children and parents ht and
ht−1, income of parents yt−1, and parental ability et−1.
2.1 Intergenerational mobility of human capital
Intergenerational mobility literature shows persistently that children raised
in highly educated families receive more schooling than children raised in
less educated families. We address the educational mobility by combining
equations (2.1) and (2.3). The resulting expression relates human capital of
the children to ability and parental human capital
ht = c0 + a0c1 + a1c1ht−1 + a2c1et−1 + c2et + c1ut−1 + wt (2.4)
Because children’s ability et is not available, we substitute (2.2) in (2.4) and
arrive at the children’s human capital relation
ht = c0 + a0c1 + b0c2+
a1c1ht−1 + (a2c1 + b1c2)et−1 + c1ut−1 + c2vt−1 + wt (2.5)
Controlling for ability, parental human capital is transmitted to children
through parental income a1c1. Part of the ability transfers run through the
same parental income channel a2c1. The other part, b1c2, is a direct ability
eﬀect on the formation of human capital .
5Goldberger (1989) speaks of mechanical rather than economic mechanisms when he
discusses intergenerational transmission models. For our exercise to be developed in this
paper we do not need the assumption that parents maximize their utility.
52.2 Intergenerational mobility of parental income
Both parental human capital and ability aﬀect the human capital investment
of children through family income, which is clearly seen when we combine
(2.2) and (2.3) and we write down for today’s generation
ht = c0 + b0c2 + c1yt−1 + b1c2et−1 + wt + c2vt (2.6)
Because high ability parents generate on average more income, there is
collinearity between et−1 and yt−1, which means that the importance of
parental income and ability per se cannot be obtained by means of direct
estimation. An alternative way to identify these eﬀects is to isolate that
part of parental income that represents income out of “luck”, namely ut−1.
If luck is identiﬁed, we are able to use luck as an instrument in (2.6) and
shed light on the overall contribution of ability, et−1. Also, equation (2.5)
allows us to estimate income eﬀects directly through c1ut−1. Later on, Sec-
tion 5 will explain the methodology of how we isolate income generated out
of market luck.6
2.3 Intergenerational mobility of ability: nature or nurture?
In this paper we refer to cognitive ability whenever we discuss ability, and we
use IQ test scores to measure it.7 The model clearly shows that ability mat-
ters. How much it exactly matters is extensively debated in the literature.
Some argue that IQ is only a poor predictor of school performance (Cawley
et al., 1996). Others claim that IQ is the driving force in explaining human
capital accumulation (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). The importance of
ability transfers increases if IQ is thought to be hereditary.
This paper adds to this debate. It inserts new evidence on the impor-
tance of the heritability of IQ, evidence that is based on a novel approach.
For parents and their biological children, ability transmissions run through
both genetic and cultural channels. For adopted children, however, genetic
transfers do not exist. Deﬁne the variable δt to denote the biological status
6Studies on the eﬀect of family income on children’s education mostly relied on realized
income measures. There are only a few studies that have actually examined the relation
between children’s outcomes and income using parental income measures that overcome
the endogeneity of parental income with repsect to children’s ability (Mayer, 1997; Blau,
1999; Plug, 1999; Shea, 2000).
7The measurement of cognitive ability or intelligence has a long history, and the pre-
vailing idea is that IQ tests do a reasonable job in measuring it; see Spearman (1927) and
more recently Cawley et al., (1996).
6of the child: δt = 1 if the child is adopted, and δt = 0 if the child is a biolog-
ical oﬀspring. If e∗
t−1 represents the parental abilities of biological parents
of adopted children, the ability mobility relationship (2.2) is modiﬁed as
follows:
et = b0 + (b1 − bg1δt)et−1 + b1gδte∗
t−1 + vt (2.7)
Since the coeﬃcient b1 represents both genetic and cultural transfers, bg1
accounts for genetic transmission only. Note that we do not observe abilities
of the natural parents of adopted children but that we do include b∗
0δt to
correct for it. Inserting this into equation (2.6) yields a human capital
function suitable for a sample of both biological and adopted children:
ht = c0 + b0c2 + b∗
0c2δt+
c1yt−1 + b1c2et−1 − bg1c2δtet−1 + wt + c2vt (2.8)
Estimates of b1c2 and bg1c2 produce our nature and nurture estimates where
a simple division disentangles environment from genes.
3 Estimation
In this model the children’s human capital is measured as years of initial
schooling. Schooling depends on observable attributes that vary within and
across families, xik = [z0
ik,z0
k]0, and unobservable individual and family com-
ponents ηik, where i and k indexes individuals and families, respectively.
Attributes that vary across members within a family are, for example, age
of the child or gender. Examples of attributes that vary across families are
family income, parental ability and education levels of parents. In our model
we view heterogeneity due to unobserved family characteristics in the con-
text of a random coeﬃcient model. If the unobservable family components
vary stochastically across families we write down
hik = α0zik + β0
kzk + ηik (3.1)
where
βk = β + ηk (3.2)
Substitution of (3.2) in (3.1) gives a linear schooling function
hik = α0zik + β0zk + ik (3.3)
7where ik = ηik+η0
kzk. The disturbance terms are normally distributed with
means equal to 0 and variances denoted as V ar[ηik] = σ2
i and V ar[ηk] = Γ.
This implies that the distribution of ik is normal; its mean is equal to
E[ik] = E[ηik + η0
kzk] = 0 (3.4)
and variance is deﬁned by
V ar[ik] = E[ik0
ik] = σ2
i + z0
kΓzk = σ2
ik (3.5)
ik is independent between households but correlates across members of the
same household. The covariance between members i and j of family k is
Cov[ik,jk] = E[ik0
jk] = z0
kΓzk (3.6)
Hence, we will estimate is a linear schooling function that allows for fami-
lywise heteroscedasticity.
The distribution of ik in (3.4)-(3.6) is indeed richly parameterized. This
represents a drawback for the iterative maximization of the log-likelihood
function deﬁned below, as there is a distinct possibility that the iterated
value of σ2
k (not to mention the ﬁnal estimate) becomes negative for at
least some k. This derails the maximization procedure. For this reason,
we respecify the distributional assumption by allowing for familywise het-
eroscedasticity in the following manner:8
σ2
ik = exp(γi) + exp(γ0zk) (3.7)
The component of the variance that owes to the heterogeneity in unobserved
family characteristics (ηk above) is given by exp(γ0zk). Consequently the
within-family correlation ρk between family members i and j may be deﬁned
as
ρk =
exp(γ0zk)
[exp(γi) + exp(γ0zk)]1/2[exp(γj) + exp(γ0zk)]1/2 (3.8)
The use of exponentiation ensures positive values both for the variance σ2
ik
and the correlation ρk.9
8The vector zk does not include a constant. This constant would be only weakly
identiﬁed, as γi already anchors the average variance.
9Individual characteristics (in our model, gender and being adopted) determine the
variance but not the correlation coeﬃcient because the latter is driven by family vari-
ables that are common across siblings. Overall, one might wish to simplify the model by
omitting this complicated covariance structure. The estimation results strongly suggest
that the heteroskedasticity and correlation characteristics of the covariance structure are
empirically meaningful. Thus, a simpler model with an i.i.d. assumption would not yield
consistent parameter estimates, owing to the frequent censoring on years of schooling.
8We now turn to the derivation of the likelihood function. For reasons
explained below, we consider a family with two children. Children who are
still in school constitute censored observations and will be treated accord-
ingly in our empirical analysis. Based on this information, we must make a
distinction between three types of families: (i) those where all children have
completed their school career; (ii) families where one of the children is still
in school; and (iii) families where all children are still in school. For the ﬁrst
group the contribution to the likelihood function is
L
(1)
k = f(ik,jk) = φ2(ik/σik,jk/σjk,ρk)/σikσjk (3.9)
where φ2(.,.,ρk) is the standard bivariate normal probability density func-
tion (pdf) with correlation coeﬃcient ρk. For families where one of the
children has not completed school yet, we have a censored schooling vari-
able resulting in a diﬀerent schooling distribution. For a child still in school
we know that his or her schooling career took at least hc
ik years, and we
know for certain the total period of schooling will be prolonged beyond hc
ik.
In this situation the likelihood function equals
L
(2)
k =
Z ∞
sik
f(ik,jk)dik = φ1(jk)(1 − Φc
1(sik | jk))/σjk (3.10)
where φ1 is the univariate standard normal pdf, and where
sik = hc
ik − α0zik − β0zk (3.11)
and where Φc
1 is a conditional univariate standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function (cdf), deﬁned as
Φc
1(sik | jk) = Φ1((sik + ρkjk)/σik
q
1 − ρ2
k) (3.12)
and Φ1 is the standard normal cdf. Finally, if all children are school going
children the contribution to the likelihood function reads as
L
(3)
k =
Z ∞
sik
Z ∞
sjk
f(ik,jk)dikdjk = Φ2(−sik/σik,−sjk/σjk,ρk) (3.13)
where Φ2 is the bivariate standard normal cdf with correlation ρk. Together,
the equations (3.9), (3.10) and (3.13) summed over the respective household
types form the likelihood function.
If a family has only one child or has more than two children, the likeli-
hood function can be derived along similar lines. Conceptually, this is not
diﬃcult, but there are major practical obstacles. One is the censoring of
9the dependent variable: for large families, censoring generates a multidi-
mensional normal probabilities.10 To simplify the analysis, we restrict the
sample to families with at least two siblings, and if a family has more than
two children we randomly select two for the analysis. This greatly reduces
the complexity of the programming eﬀort and comes only at the cost of
diminished precision and a small amount of randomness in the outcomes of
the investigation.
An alternative approach to deal with unobserved family characteristics
is to apply ﬁxed eﬀects estimators. By diﬀerencing schooling functions of
siblings (or biological and adopted children) the unobservable components
that vary across families drop out and observables that vary across siblings
remain. The reason why we do not use ﬁxed eﬀects models is that we
cannot estimate how much is attributed to environment and how much to
genes. To disentangle nature from nurture we require both individual and
family speciﬁc estimators where the family speciﬁc parameter measures the
degree to which intelligent parents produce intelligent children and where
the individual parameter removes genetical ability transfers for the adopted
siblings.
4 Data
This paper employs the Wisconsin Longitudinal Survey which is an unique
American dataset with information on people who were born around 1940.
The collection of these data started in 1957 with a questionnaire adminis-
tered to the complete cohort of students who graduated from a high school
in the American state Wisconsin in that year. The information in that ﬁrst
wave relates to the children’s social background (parents’ education and
occupation, numbers of older and younger sibling), intelligence (measured
as standardized IQ test scores), and aspirations. Subsequently, research
was continued on a randomly selected one third of the original cohort. In
1964 and 1975, the respondents was approached again to obtain information
about, among others, their schooling and labor market careers. In 1992, the
same sample of persons was contacted once more in order to collect new in-
formation about their labor market experiences between their late 30s and
early 50’s. As well, this latest round contained questions about many facets
10High-dimensional normal probabilities may be evaluated with simulation techniques;
e.g., see Vijverberg (1997). However, with diﬀerent households oﬀering diﬀerent dimen-
sions, this is a daunting programming task, which we leave for future research.
10of life events and attitudes. For more information on the WLS data, see,
among others, Sewell and Hauser (1992) and Hauser et al. (1996).
Of particular interest for the present study, a set of questions targeted
the educational attainment of the respondents’ children. Respondents were
asked to list for each child the highest grade or year of regular school that
child ever attended, whether (s)he completed this grade or year, and whether
(s)he attended a regular school in the last 12 months. From the information
on educational attainment we create the variable “years of schooling.” For
those children who completed the highest level attended, years of schooling
equals the number of years nominally required for that. Children who were
still in school constitute censored observations and will be treated accord-
ingly in our empirical analysis; this is the case for about 20 percent of our
sample. Note that deleting these observations from the analysis will cause
the results to be biased. This holds true especially for the age variable be-
cause in that case only low achieving young children will be included in the
sample. As the respondents in the sample often have more than one child,
we construct sibling information variables for each child. Finally, we use
information on the relationship of the child to the respondent to distinguish
adopted children from children with their biological parents.
The other explanatory variables are common to all children from one
family. These variables can be divided into two groups: human capital
variables and ﬁnancial variables. We discuss each group in turn. Human
capital variables are years of schooling of the children’s parents (one of
whom is a respondent of the original 1957 sample); the respondent’s IQ
score at age 16; and years of schooling of the respondent’s parents. Financial
variables included in our analysis are family income measured in 1992 and in
1975. Since income is positively correlated with the family’s human capital
variables, we need a human-capital-free income measure to separate the
eﬀect of income from the eﬀects of human capital. Through a procedure
outlined in detail in Section 5.1, we identify an income component that
is not correlated with observed or even unobserved human capital: this
component represents random income shocks.
The number of original observations we begin with in 1957 equals 10317,
but we restrict ourselves basically to the 8500 people who responded to the
1992 questionnaire. In this paper we do not want to get involved in compli-
cations that arise if children are brought up in incomplete families. So, we
select about 6700 standard families from which all childless and one-parent
families are excluded. From the remaining families, about 1350 observations
had to be removed from the analysis due to missing (or incomplete) obser-
11vations on the family income measures in 1975 and 1992, on their children’s
age, gender and educational attainment. At this point we have 5365 families
and 13626 children in our sample. Then we restrict the sample to families
with at least two children, and if a family has more than two children we
randomly select two for the analysis. Finally, we exclude families where
both children are adopted. We end up with a sample of 6460 children from
3230 families. Descriptive statistics appear in Table A1. The ﬁrst column
reports statistics on the restricted sample, the second column applies to all
children in the WLS database.
5 Results
To gain insight into how human capital is transferred across diﬀerent gen-
erations, the empirical results will be presented along the lines set out in
Section 2. We begin with the analysis on human capital persistence across
generations. In Table 1 we estimate equation (2.5). Among family-level
variables we ﬁnd, not surprisingly, that highly educated parents stimulate
their children’s education, and that high scores on childhood IQ tests (of
either mother or father) raises the number of years of schooling. The ef-
fect of both father’s and mother’s education is about the same. This seems
at odds with what is usually observed (Becker, 1970; Haveman and Wolfe,
1995; Ermisch and Francesconi, 2000). They ﬁnd that the level of education
of the mother is more closely related to the educational attainment of the
child than is that of the father.11
Among individual-level determinants we ﬁnd that younger children in-
vest more in human capital than older ones, and that daughters stay in
school somewhat longer. We also observe that having brothers or sisters has
a negative eﬀect on the educational attainment of children. Within fami-
lies we ﬁnd a positive correlation ρk (equation (3.8)) between educational
achievement of siblings that is typically around 0.29, with minor variations
across households.
11Their argument is the following. Since women have inborn comparative advantages in
home investment, and thus in raising children during their preschool years the impact of
her education on their children’s school success is higher. We suspect that our ﬁndings are
somewhat diﬀerent because of sample selectivity with respect to parental education. We
only examine families where one of the parents is at least a high school graduate. Since
more education raises labor market attachment, mothers in our sample will probably spend
relatively more time working and less time raising her oﬀspring than the average U.S. (or
Wisconsin) mother, which might explain our ﬁndings.
125.1 Does parental income matter?
It is clear from these results that there are large transfers of human capital
between two generations. However, these estimates cannot tell whether
parental human capital is transferred to the child through parental income,
through genes, through social background variables, or through culture.
To address the question whether income has a positive impact on chil-
dren’s human capital accumulation, we estimate equation (2.6) using two
diﬀerent income measures; see Table 2. The ﬁrst column utilizes family in-
come measured in 1975. At this time the respondent is about 34 years old
and, on average, his or her children will be in primary or the early years of
secondary school. At this stage, schooling is compulsory, implying (at ﬁrst
glance) that family factors should at most have a muted eﬀect. But recall
that the dependent variable is completed (or, if so be the case, censored)
years of schooling. 1975 family income may have two eﬀects on eventually
completed schooling. First, there is a lifecycle argument: schooling later
on is paid for by savings from income received earlier. Second, early in-
come is allocated to create a family environment that is conducive to the
child’s success in school, which in turn invites further schooling investment
when the child has become a young adult. For both argument, it is mostly
the permanent component in 1975 income that creates the eﬀect. In any
case, column 1 of Table 2 reports a strong positive parental income eﬀect.
In column 2, family income of 1992 is used. At this stage of the parental
lifecycle, most children have just ended their schooling career, and college
expenses may still be taking a big bite out of the parents’ budget. Again,
it is permanent income that matters. If parents anticipate on their future
income (which is closely related to permanent income) while funding their
children’s education, 1992 income will still be important when the children
have ﬁnished school. Even so, whether we use 1975 or 1992 income the es-
timated income eﬀects are not substantially diﬀerent. To see whether it is
income in 1975 or income in 1992 that is most important we included both
income measures simultaneously. Both estimates remain about the same.
Parental income seems important, whether it is obtained when students are
in their in early childhood, or when they already left school.
These robust ﬁndings indicate that permanent income matters, however,
they do not necessarily tell us that parental income itself has a beneﬁcial
impact on children. The problem is that pure human capital and ability
eﬀects operate through income as well. A more sophisticated way to study
parental income eﬀects is to identify that part of parental income that repre-
13sents luck. The idea is to imitate a lottery where money is given to randomly
selected parents at diﬀerent points in time, and then to track the subsequent
school performance of their children. If income truly matters we should see
at least two things. First, children should do better in school when parents
are handed over their prize money when their oﬀspring are still in school.
And second, no eﬀects are expected when parents win their lottery prize and
children have already left school. Since parents cannot foresee (future) varia-
tion in their income when their children have ﬁnished school, it is impossible
to anticipate on it while funding their children’s education.
In this paper, it is this experiment we mimic. We extract random in-
come shocks using information on 1975 and 1992 income. To be precise,
we predict log family income in both 1975 and 1992 on the basis of ob-
served human capital and ability measures, and we compute residuals for
both years. The estimated equations from which residuals are computed
are reported in the ﬁrst part of Table 3. These new money measures will
depend both on unobserved parental ability measures and luck in the mar-
ket for the respective years. If one assumes that unobserved parental ability
measures are correlated, and that luck components are not, regressing the
1992 income measure on the 1975 measure should pick up these unobserved
parental abilities; the residual of this equation proxies that component of
the 1992 family income that reasonably represents luck. And in reverse, if
we regress the 1975 residual on our 1992 measure we obtain a measure for
income generated by luck experienced in 1975. The equations from which
the luck components are derived can be found in the second part of Table 3.
Note that this technique purges any income determinant that remains con-
stant over at least this portion of the lifecycle; this includes ethnic factors,
personality traits, or indeed “structural luck.”12
Now both luck components are entered into the children’s human cap-
ital equation as a parental income measure; see Table 4. To estimate the
true impact of parental income we compare the impact on the children’s ed-
ucational attainment of random income shocks experienced when children
are still in school and when most children have left school. We observe
that parental income eﬀects fall in 1975 and 1992 but remain signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
By replacing family income with that income part that is generated by
12Notice that the “luck component” as derived here is closely related to the notion of
transitory income. To be structurally lucky is similar to having a structurally positive ﬂow
of transitory income, which one would typically interpret as being a part of permanent
income.
14luck on the market, we end up with a hybrid model that contains elements of
both (2.5) and (2.6). We avoid this problem if we add both luck components
to the human capital transfer equation (2.5). This is what we do in column 2
and 3 of Table 1. Compared with column 1 of Table 1, the parental education
and IQ eﬀects remain almost identical. Both comparisons show however that
lucky income measured in 1975 and 1992 exert their own eﬀects.
These results are paradoxical in the light of the design of the lucky income
variable and its timing. On the one hand, family income observed in 1975
matters even if one purges the income component that derives from ability
transfers between parents and oﬀspring. On the other hand, the analysis
with 1992 income shows similar patterns. Should one conclude that the
random income variable measures unobservable traits that drive educational
achievement, such as personality? By design, such lifecycle traits have been
purged away. Could it then be that the 1992 random income was not truly
unforeseeable? One might argue that, because it is uncorrelated with 1975
income, it was not foreseeable in 1975 but that the 1992 random income
variations are reﬂective of (un-)favorable ﬁnancial events that played out
over a longer period. In support of this, the eﬀect of the 1975 random
income seems larger (one third of the eﬀect of total income, see Table 2)
than a single year’s variation ought to have on a lifecycle outcome such as a
child’s schooling. Thus, 1975 random incomes may well pertain to ﬁnancial
fortunes in years around 1975, not just 1975 itself. Such questions can only
be answered with more frequent measurements of income.
However, if we repeat our experiment assuming that our observed ran-
dom income shocks not only describe unanticipated shocks in years 1975 and
1992 itself, but also those received prior to both years, income matters if
the 1975 random component aﬀects all children where the 1992 component
only hits those who are relatively young (and are still in school or left school
recently). In Table 4 we estimate the previous model with 1975 and 1992
random income interacted with age. Compared to earlier results we ﬁnd
this time that it is only random income measured in 1992 that generates
negative signiﬁcant interacted age eﬀects. Interacted 1975 random income
eﬀects are smaller and not signiﬁcant. Apparently, income itself has to a
certain extent a beniﬁciary inﬂuence on the child’s school performance.
To summarize our income results, we tested the idea that a better ac-
cess to ﬁnancial resources improve the children’s educational achievement in
three diﬀerent ways using (i) observed family income in 1975 and 1992; (ii)
components of 1975 and 1992 family income that reasonably represent luck;
and (iii) both luck components allowing for interactions with the child’s age.
15All tests demonstrate that permanent family income including permanent
family factors like parental education, and parental IQ are decisive factors
in explaining the relation between family income and the child’s years spent
in school. Only with the third method we are able to show that (tran-
sitory) family income itself matters too. This observation is in line with
what previous researchers have found. That is, direct family income eﬀects
on the child’s schooling attainment run foremost through the permanent
component of family income. And if short run variation in family income
(or transitory family income) exerts a positive inﬂuence its eﬀect is rather
limited (see Shea (2000), Cameron and Taber (2000), Chevalier and Lanot
(1999), Cameron and Heckman (1998), Mayer (1997)).
5.2 Is it nature or nurture that matters?
So far we have been rather silent when it comes to the eﬀects of ability.
Fully in line with other literature, we ﬁnd that parental IQ predicts school
performance of children. This implies that the inﬂuence of IQ transcends
over generations. An intriguing question deals with the problem of nature
and nurture. Is it inheritance or is it the environment which is the primary
factor in explaining schooling diﬀerences of children?
In this Section we will open the discussion on the heritability of IQ and
use information on adopted children. We begin with estimating equation
(2.6) adding an adoption dummy for adopted children to see how adopted
children perform in school. In Table 5 we ﬁnd that adopted children do
worse with respect to the total years of schooling. We observe this for
family income measured in 1975 and 1992.
To isolate that part of IQ that stems from genetic transmission we need
to include the IQ covariate for adopted children. This is what we do in the
second column of Table 5 where we estimate equation (2.8). IQ corrections
for adopted children turn out to be negative which correspond with the idea
that intelligence measured as childhood IQ is to a certain extent inherited.
Note however that these eﬀects are signiﬁcantly negative in the margin.
Only if we use family income measured in 1975 interacted IQ eﬀects are
signiﬁcant at a 10 percent level. This turns out to be a cell size eﬀect.
In the present sample of 6460 children only 114 are adopted. Later on we
will use a much larger sample and ﬁnd all relevant adoption eﬀects to be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Our model also provides estimates on how much can be attributed to
environment and how much to genes. The parameter estimates attached to
16the variable “IQ of parent” indicate the degree to which intelligent parents
produce intelligent children who are more likely to obtain more schooling:
these parameters combine cultural and biological eﬀects, b1c2. The param-
eters of the interaction eﬀect “IQ of parent × being adopted” (i.e., bg1c2)
removes the direct genetical ability transfers that cannot occur with re-
spect to adopted. From both parameters we conclude that both nature and
nurture matter but also that genetics are the primary factor in explaining
schooling diﬀerences of children. We ﬁnd that of all ability transfers about
79 percent run through genes. Compared to Behrman and Taubman (1989)
who estimate that about 80 percent of the variation in schooling can be
attributed to the genes, we end up with almost identical numbers. Note
that they arrive at their nature estimate using variance decomposition on a
sample of relatives and twins while we decompose ability eﬀects in the form
of regression slopes on a sample of biological and adopted children.
In the third column we run the same regression using income representing
luck as a regressor. The inﬂuence of IQ increases since it picks up that part
of income that is generated by it. But the size of the genetic component
(bg1c2) remains the same. Consequently, we ﬁnd that of all ability transfers
the genetic component falls from 79 to 65 percent.
5.3 Sons and daughters separately
So far we have pooled sons and daughters. However, it is possible that
there is some human capital diﬀerentiation between girls and boys. Thus,
the speciﬁcations reported above must be estimated separately for boys and
girls (while at the same time allowing for common family heterogeneity
factors). This is what we do in Table 6. Results are as follows.
The estimates in the ﬁrst column show that parental IQ and 1975 in-
come do not seem to aﬀect sons and daughters diﬀerently. If we disentangle
cultural from biological IQ eﬀects we do observe diﬀerences. For sons we
ﬁnd that about 55 percent of parental IQ eﬀects run through the genes.
For daughters the genetic component amounts to 95 percent. Although the
impact of nature is much higher for girls than it is for boys, diﬀerences are
not signiﬁcant. If we use our luck component of 1975 income we ﬁnd that
income eﬀects fall and IQ eﬀects rise. Our nature estimates show this time
that with respect to IQ transfers and years spent in school about 42 and 90
percent are in his and her genes. By not treating 1975 income as an explicit
environmental variable the nurture component of parental IQ compensates
for the falling impact of parental income.
17If we repeat the analysis with 1992 income, parental IQ eﬀects remain
similar, and income eﬀects become somewhat higher for sons. Our nature
estimates show that with respect to IQ transfers and educational outcomes
44 percent is in the genes for boys. Our 102 percent estimate for girls shows
that it is all genetics. With 1992 income that is generated by market luck
we ﬁnd that the nature component for sons and daughters drop and become
32 and 90 procent respectively.
In the end, however, all likelihood ratio tests indicate that this model
and the model we estimate in Table 6 are statistically identical (critical value
is set at 14.1). Hence, in all four diﬀerent speciﬁcations the estimates can-
not reveal that boys and girls are aﬀected diﬀerently by family background
variables such as family income and parental IQ, or that the environment
treats boys and girls diﬀerently.
6 Selectivity, adopting families and adopted chil-
dren
While our nature and nurture estimates suggest that genes are rather de-
cisive, we should treat our estimates with care. Since we do not observe
ability of the natural parents of adopted children, the estimates may still
suﬀer from ability bias. In fact, we are quite convinced that such a bias
exists. To determine sources of this bias, it is instructive to return to our
model once more. If e∗
t−1 represents the parental abilities of biological par-
ents of adopted children, the corrected ability mobility relation is deﬁned
as
et = b0 + (b1 − bg1δt)et−1 + bg1δte∗
t−1 + vt (6.1)
which implies that the human capital function reads as
ht = c0 + b0c2 + c1yt−1+
b1c2et−1 − bg1c2δtet−1 + bg1c2δte∗
t−1 + wt + c2vt (6.2)
With this in mind, we brieﬂy outline some of the potential dangers of ability
bias.
• Selection in genes and adopted children.
Children who are given up for adoption are more likely to have less
favorable socio-economic backgrounds. The mechanism to explain why
18adopted children are on average less intelligent is built on the positive
relation between ability and income. Young single mothers, or poor
families in developing countries, face on average more diﬃculties to
make ends meet, and are therefore more likely to register their children
for adoption. These children will be on average less endowed. If this
negative correlation between being adopted, δt, and ability of natural
parent(s), e∗
t−1, is picked up by the estimated adoption parameter, our
nature estimate overestimates the impact of genetic transfers.
• Selection in environment and adopted children.
In our model we isolate environmental inﬂuences in which children
are brought up. For adopted children, however, the inﬂuence of the
environment may diﬀer because there is heterogeneity with respect to
the age these children met their adopting families. We end up only
estimating an average correction for being adopted. If we assume the
environmental contribution to ability is maximal for children who are
adopted as babies, the implication is that for children in our sample
the genetic inﬂuence is biased upwards.
If cultural transfers within a family are assumed equal for children who
are adopted as babies and children who are brought up by their bio-
logical parents, the argument goes as follows. With bc1 as the cultural
transfer parameter, the ability mobility relation reads as
et = b0 + (bc1 + bg1)(1 − δt)et−1 + bc1δtet−1 + bg1δte∗
t−1 + vt
With the information at hand we are only able to measure an average
environmental correction for adopted children
et = b0 + (bc1 + bg1)(1 − δt)et−1 + b∗
c1δtet−1 + bg1δte∗
t−1 + vt
where b∗
c1 represents this average eﬀect. The modiﬁed ability relation
is written down as
et = b0 + b1et−1 − bg1δtet−1 + (b∗
c1 − bc1)δtet−1 + bg1δte∗
t−1 + vt
Compared to equation (6.1) we end up with an additional part (b∗
c1 −
bc1)δtet−1. With adopted babies in mind this term is negative implying
that the genetic eﬀect we estimate is biased upwards. For children
19who were just brought to their adoption families, the estimated nature
correction is of course too low.
Note that in this situation selection eﬀects occur not because we do
not observe the ability of the natural parents but because we fail to
observe when these children are placed in adoption families.
• Selection and adopting families.
In many situations adoption agencies have speciﬁc family recruitment
programs to sort out families who are suitable for adoption. Hence,
adoption families are likely to have more favorable socio-economic
backgrounds. For our estimates this has no consequences because we
observe their ability, et−1 and therefore correct for this potential bias.
• Selection and matching mechanisms.
So far, we assumed that adoption families and their adopted children
were randomly matched. Problems occur if there is endogeneity in the
matching process. For example, adoption agencies may have matching
strategies where information on the natural mother’s education, work-
ing career et cetera is used to match the children of natural mothers
to adopting families. Also families may choose their adoption children
on the basis of similarities.
If we speak of perfect assortative matching the families ability compo-
nent et−1 would be “identical” to e∗
t−1 implying that observed nature
eﬀects would fully disappear. Any observable adoption eﬀects would
then be attributed to diﬀerences in raising these children. More specif-
ically, adoption eﬀects would exist only if (i) parents emotionally and
materially diﬀerentiate between biological and adopted children, or (ii)
adopted children fail to receive the life-long nurture eﬀects because,
by deﬁnition, they are placed in adoption families at a later age.
If we assume an imperfect assortative matching mechanism fortunate
families will have on average adopted children with a higher ability.
And biased estimates are produced to the extent that et−1 and e∗
t−1
are positively correlated. The result is that nature eﬀects will be un-
derestimated.
• Diﬀerentials in upbringing.
The interpretation of our nature estimate requires that parents do not
diﬀerentiate between their biological and adopted children. That is,
20families should treat their children equally with respect to the time and
money they invest in them. This does not imply that our model cannot
account for potential behavioral diﬀerences. In fact, treatment diﬀer-
entials are partly accounted for adoption dummies in (2.8).13 However,
if these diﬀerences in upbringing end up in our observed bg1 estimate,
interpretation of our heritability factor becomes troublesome.
To see how our nature estimate is aﬀected we discuss three motives
why parents treat adopted children diﬀerently from their biological
ones. The ﬁrst motive assumes that parents care equally about their
children’s welfare. In this situation parents choose to invest more in
their adopted children to compensate for their ability deﬁcit. The
second motive is less altruistic. Parents only invest to generate the
highest return. In this situation adopted children receive less educa-
tional funding. The third motive is mostly selﬁsh. Parents may be
expecting closer ties (ﬁnancial and otherwise) in their old age with
their biological children than with their adopted ones. Thus, they
invest more in the education of their biological children.
Implications for our nature estimate are the following. If parents invest
less in their adopted children nature eﬀects will be overestimated. And
if parents invest more in their adopted children the eﬀects are reversed.
To test how serious some of these selection eﬀects really are, we would need
to know the socio-economic background of the biological parents of adopted
children, and information on the timing of the adoption. The WLS does not
provide this information. Hence, testing is not possible.
We begin to shed light on the things we do know. Table 7 tabulates
means and standard deviations of biological and adopted children. The
variables can be divided into two distinctive groups: individual variables,
and social background variables. We discuss each group in turn.
With respect to individual variables we start with comparing the years
of education across adopted and biological children for diﬀerent genders.
Conform the results in Table 5 we ﬁnd that non-adopted children accumulate
more human capital than adopted children. Adopted children are typically
2.4 years younger, and, as a consequence, are more likely to be in school still.
Since the WLS is a cohort survey, this also implies that adopting parents
13In addition to the observed diﬀerences between biological and adopted children, we
allow for diﬀerences in the unobservables too. That is, we vary the variance σ
2
k to the
extent that random variation in both ability and schooling variables come from diﬀerent
distributions for adopted and biological children.
21are usually older than biological parents. Simple t-statistics indicate that
with the exception of gender all the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant; see column
3, Table 7.
With respect to family background variables we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences too. Adopting families have on average fewer children. The structural
diﬀerences in the socioeconomic characteristics of biologically related and
adopting families indicate that either adopting agencies or adopting fami-
lies are selective. Adopting families turn out to be above average in all their
socioeconomic characteristics. Note furthermore that although observed dif-
ferences in individual and family characteristics are favorable for the human
capital accumulation of adopted children the estimates in Table 5 show that
adopted children remain worse oﬀ with respect to years of schooling even
when we control for their favorable individual and background characteris-
tics.
So far, two things have become clear. First, adopted and biological
children structurally diﬀer in their observables. Second, if adopted and
biological children structurally diﬀer in their unobservables the nature and
nurture estimates suﬀer from ability bias. In most situations the bias points
to overestimated nature eﬀects. In fact, we can only think of two clear
selectivity eﬀects where our heritability estimate is too low: (i) if adoption
agencies use corresponding qualities of both natural and adoptive parents
as a matching strategy, and (ii) if parents invest more time and money
in adopted children. In the remainder of this Section, we will argue (and
test) that these two situations are not fully applicable, and that our nurture
estimate of 20 to 35 percent turns out to be a rather conservative estimate.
Do adoption agencies use matching strategies based on similarities be-
tween adopted child and adoptive parents, and select therefore families with
relatively less favorable socio-economic backgrounds? In Table 8 we test
whether adoption families are randomly drawn from the population at large.
We ﬁnd that adoption agencies are not blind. Estimates of simple logit mod-
els indicate that the chances of a household being adoptive rise especially
when the mother is more educated. Parental IQ does not matter. For our
exercise this result is fortunate, but not unexpected. Agencies do not have
information on the IQ levels of adopting parents. Note that we are aware
that these logits are reduced form models and can also be interpreted as
if adoption families select themselves–but if so, one would have expected a
more prominent role of IQ. Since it is not clear whether agencies use the
described matching procedures, and since IQ eﬀects are fairly small the re-
sulting bias is probably not substantial.
22Do parents treat their adopted children diﬀerently? We are inclined to
say no since we have analyzed only families with both biological and adopted
children. If a diﬀerent upbringing within a family leads to stigmatization,
and parents realize that this is damaging for their children’s career they
will act accordingly. Still some previous researchers have found that parents
may feel the urge to protect their own genetic material and as a conse-
quence invest less in their adopted children (Dawkins, 1976; Case, Fin and
McLanahan, 2000). If the latter is the case our nature estimate is too high.
As a ﬁnal test of robustness, we estimate the earlier models in Table
5 using an alternative sample and a simpliﬁed estimation procedure. This
sample now contains all children in the WLS database. The simpliﬁed es-
timation procedure allows for censored observations, assumes independence
between family members, and does not allow for unobserved heterogene-
ity. Results are tabulated in Table 9. The parameter estimates do not
diﬀer much compared to those presented in Table 5, with one exception,
namely that this time all relevant adoption parameters signiﬁcantly diﬀer
from zero.14 With respect to the genetic component in the ability transfers
we ﬁnd the same high proportions.
In summary, we expect our nature and nurture estimates to be biased.
Our results do provide some useful insights. We ﬁnd that, of the total ability
transfer, the statistics of 65 to 79 percent may be viewed as upper bounds
of our nature estimates. The observation that nature is more dominant in
explaining schooling diﬀerences remains.
7 Concluding remarks
Intergenerational mobility literature shows persistently that children raised
in high educated families are higher educated than children raised in low
educated families. In this paper we examine whether ability measured as
IQ is the dominant factor behind this family connection. In it, we ﬁnd that
parental IQ matters for the educational attainment of children. Neverthe-
less, the notion that high ability parents produce high ability children who
are more likely to obtain more schooling is not the only mechanism at work.
Our sample reveals two additional mechanisms: (i) if we control for parental
ability in the children’s schooling function parental education is found to be
14In the sample used for Table 5, 114 children were adopted. Here, 545 children are
adopted, which accounts for the relatively greater increase in precision of the adoption
parameters.
23of importance too; and (ii) if we trace back those students whose parents ex-
perienced “lucky” (or random) income shocks we ﬁnd that parental income
exerts a positive inﬂuence on the educational attainment of the children.
We further exploit a special feature of the dataset and disentangle per-
sistence eﬀects caused by nature and nurture. Using information whether
these children are their parents’ own oﬀspring as opposed to adopted chil-
dren, we ﬁnd that about 65 to 79 percent of the ability eﬀects relevant for
school achievement can be attributed to genetic eﬀects. We explore reasons
why these nature estimates may be biased, and we conclude that they are
likely biased upwards.
Our results thus indicate that it is rather complicated to ﬁnd out which
factors are exactly behind this family connection. From our exercise we
learn at least four things: (i) that it is only to a certain extent that a better
access to ﬁnancial resources is an important factor in explaining the educa-
tional attainment of children; (ii) that ability and a more favorable academic
environment do explain variation in the children’s years of schooling; (iii)
that the largest part of ability relevant for education is inherited; and (iv)
that, in these regards, there is no diﬀerence between sons and daughters.
As a ﬁnal note, the public policy implications of these ﬁndings are rather
signiﬁcant. Much money is spent on the educational system. The under-
lying rationale is to create an environment in which students ﬂourish. If
nurture drives the success of children in school, a one-time equalization of
educational opportunities will erase past inequalities in schooling; the next
generation of children will start out equally. On the other hand, if children’s
ability is determined to a large extent genetically, a nurturing school en-
vironment may help the less able children to overcome their disadvantage
only at great cost; moreover, the ability of the next generation of children is
still unequally distributed. In the former case, the rationale behind educa-
tional expenses is primarily productive and only once redistributive; in the
latter case, educational expenses are repeatedly redistributive and only sec-
ondarily productive. This tension deﬁnes the political debate on educational
ﬁnancing and explains the boom-and-bust nature of educational budgeting.
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28Table A1: Descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations
WLS samples: restricted full
ﬁrst child all children
years of education 13.328 2.541 years of education 13.238 2.597
still in school (censored) 0.234 0.423 still in school (censored) 0.229 0.420
gender (daughter) 0.478 0.499 gender (daughter) 0.488 0.499
age 26.283 5.043 age 26.231 5.171
being adopted 0.017 0.132 being adopted 0.040 0.196
second child number of
years of education 13.347 2.546 children 13626
still in school (censored) 0.208 0.406
gender (daughter) 0.486 0.499
age 26.514 5.079
being adopted 0.017 0.130
family family
number of siblings 2.323 1.339 number of siblings 2.243 1.511
IQ parent 10.064 1.406 IQ parent 10.161 1.418
education of father in years 13.422 2.541 education of father in years 13.627 2.666
education of mother in years 12.810 1.697 education of mother in years 12.915 1.763
log family income 1975 9.678 0.486 log family income 1975 9.698 0.491
log family income 1992 10.966 0.655 log family income 1992 11.000 0.656
log random income 1975 0.000 0.428 log random income 1975 0.000 0.435
log random income 1992 0.000 0.552 log random income 1992 0.000 0.555
number of number of
children and families 3230 families 5365
Standard deviations in italics
29Table 1: Education and parental human capital eﬀects
years of education
intercept 8.272 0.386∗∗∗ 8.305 0.386∗∗∗ 8.309 0.385∗∗∗
daughter 0.126 0.054∗∗∗ 0.127 0.054∗∗∗ 0.131 0.054∗∗∗
age -0.072 0.007∗∗∗ -0.074 0.007∗∗∗ -0.073 0.007∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.151 0.023∗∗∗ 0.152 0.023∗∗∗ 0.153 0.023∗∗∗
education father 0.252 0.015∗∗∗ 0.252 0.015∗∗∗ 0.250 0.015∗∗∗
education mother 0.254 0.022∗∗∗ 0.253 0.022∗∗∗ 0.252 0.022∗∗∗
random income 1975 0.261 0.073∗∗∗
random income 1992 0.321 0.053∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.124 0.021∗∗∗ -0.119 0.021∗∗∗ -0.126 0.021∗∗∗
variance of years of education
intercept 1.194 0.023∗∗∗ 1.196 0.023∗∗∗ 1.195 0.024∗∗∗
daughter -0.194 0.030∗∗∗ -0.194 0.030∗∗∗ -0.203 0.031∗∗∗
IQ of parent -0.063 0.032∗∗ -0.064 0.032∗∗ -0.051 0.032∗
education father 0.070 0.020∗∗∗ 0.071 0.023∗∗∗ 0.061 0.021∗∗∗
education mother 0.009 0.027 0.006 0.029 0.009 0.028
random income 1975 -0.021 0.133
random income 1992 -0.049 0.073
number of siblings -0.113 0.036∗∗∗ -0.109 0.037∗∗∗ -0.120 0.037∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.444 -3.441 -3.438
N 3230 3230 3230
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
Table 2: Education and parental income eﬀects
years of education
intercept 5.975 0.655∗∗∗ 5.744 0.570∗∗∗ 2.668 0.745∗∗∗
daughter 0.157 0.056∗∗∗ 0.162 0.055∗∗∗ 0.161 0.055∗∗∗
age -0.110 0.007∗∗∗ -0.103 0.007∗∗∗ -0.104 0.007∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.359 0.023∗∗∗ 0.315 0.023∗∗∗ 0.299 0.023∗∗∗
log income 1975 0.824 0.065∗∗∗ 0.502 0.072∗∗∗
log income 1992 0.771 0.047∗∗∗ 0.623 0.052∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.173 0.022∗∗∗ -0.178 0.021∗∗∗ -0.167 0.022∗∗∗
variance of years of education
individual component
intercept 1.217 0.025∗∗∗ 1.211 0.025∗∗∗ 1.211 0.024∗∗∗
daughter -0.182 0.033∗∗∗ -0.206 0.034∗∗∗ -0.204 0.033∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.120 0.040∗∗∗ 0.145 0.040∗∗∗ 0.128 0.043∗∗∗
log income 1975 -0.057 0.046 -0.038 0.071
log income 1992 -0.071 0.039∗∗ -0.024 0.060
number of siblings -0.095 0.040∗∗∗ -0.110 0.038∗∗∗ -0.111 0.040∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.520 -3.507 -3.500
N 3230 3230 3230
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
30Table 3: Estimating the luck components of family income in 1975 and 1992
Part I: Estimating family income using observed human capital characteristics
log family income: 1975 1992
intercept 8.466 0.074∗∗∗ 8.825 0.095∗∗∗
female -0.045 0.016∗∗∗ -0.142 0.020∗∗∗
IQ parent 0.025 0.006∗∗∗ 0.064 0.008∗∗∗
education of father 0.041 0.004∗∗∗ 0.061 0.005∗∗∗
education of mother 0.023 0.005∗∗∗ 0.044 0.007∗∗∗
education of grandfather 0.008 0.003∗∗∗ 0.007 0.004∗
education of grandmother 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.004∗
R-square 0.120 0.197
N 3230 3230
Part II: Estimating random income using unobserved human capital characteristics
log unexplained income: 1975 1992
intercept 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.009
unexplained income 1975 0.438 0.021∗∗∗
unexplained income 1992 0.264 0.012∗∗∗
R-square 0.115 0.115
N 3230 3230
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
31Table 4: Education and random parental income eﬀects
years of education
intercept 13.619 0.316∗∗∗ 13.599 0.315∗∗∗
daughter 0.156 0.056∗∗∗ 0.159 0.056∗∗∗
age -0.112 0.008∗∗∗ -0.111 0.007∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.405 0.023∗∗∗ 0.405 0.023∗∗∗
random income 1975 0.280 0.073∗∗∗
random income 1992 0.369 0.058∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.199 0.022∗∗∗ -0.205 0.022∗∗∗
variance of years of education
individual component
intercept 1.218 0.025∗∗∗ 1.214 0.025∗∗∗
daughter -0.176 0.034∗∗∗ -0.183 0.035∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.079 0.009∗∗∗ 0.080 0.009∗∗∗
random income 1975 0.048 0.107
random income 1992 0.033 0.064
number of siblings -0.116 0.037∗∗∗ -0.120 0.037∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.542 -3.538
N 3230 3230
years of education
intercept 13.627 0.316∗∗∗ 13.603 0.315∗∗∗
daughter 0.157 0.057∗∗∗ 0.156 0.056∗∗∗
age -0.112 0.008∗∗∗ -0.111 0.007∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.405 0.023∗∗∗ 0.406 0.023∗∗∗
random income 1975 0.639 0.540
random income 1975×age -0.012 0.019
random income 1992 1.025 0.393∗∗∗
random income 1992×age -0.023 0.014∗∗
number of siblings -0.200 0.022∗∗∗ -0.205 0.022∗∗∗
variance of years of education
individual component
intercept 1.219 0.025∗∗∗ 1.213 0.025∗∗∗
daughter -0.176 0.034∗∗∗ -0.182 0.035∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.079 0.009∗∗∗ 0.080 0.009∗∗∗
random income 1975 0.059 0.110
random income 1992 0.037 0.065
number of siblings -0.117 0.038∗∗∗ -0.119 0.037∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.542 -3.537
N 3230 3230
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
32Table 5: Education and nature and nurture eﬀects of parental ability
years of education
intercept 5.978 0.651∗∗∗ 5.937 0.652∗∗∗ 13.614 0.317∗∗∗
daughter 0.154 0.056∗∗∗ 0.154 0.056∗∗∗ 0.154 0.057∗∗∗
age -0.112 0.007∗∗∗ -0.112 0.007∗∗∗ -0.114 0.008∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.361 0.023∗∗∗ 0.365 0.023∗∗∗ 0.412 0.023∗∗∗
log income 1975 0.828 0.064∗∗∗ 0.829 0.064∗∗∗
log random income 1975 0.281 0.073∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.176 0.022∗∗∗ -0.175 0.022∗∗∗ -0.201 0.022∗∗∗
being adopted -0.713 0.315∗∗ 2.259 2.330 2.259 2.280
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.289 0.226∗ -0.285 0.223∗
variance of years of education
individual component
intercept 1.206 0.025∗∗∗ 1.205 0.025∗∗∗ 1.207 0.025∗∗∗
daughter -0.173 0.033∗∗∗ -0.172 0.033∗∗∗ -0.168 0.035∗∗∗
being adopted 0.432 0.109∗∗∗ 0.380 0.108∗∗∗ 0.386 0.116∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.115 0.040∗∗∗ 0.116 0.040∗∗∗ 0.079 0.009∗∗∗
log income 1975 -0.053 0.046 -0.053 0.046
log random income 1975 0.044 0.109
number of siblings -0.099 0.040∗∗∗ -0.099 0.040∗∗∗ -0.119 0.037∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.517 -3.517 -3.539
N 3230 3230 3230
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀects 0.791 0.691
years of education
intercept 5.771 0.569∗∗∗ 5.743 0.569∗∗∗ 13.595 0.316∗∗∗
daughter 0.159 0.056∗∗∗ 0.160 0.056∗∗∗ 0.157 0.057∗∗∗
age -0.104 0.007∗∗∗ -0.104 0.007∗∗∗ -0.112 0.007∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.317 0.023∗∗∗ 0.320 0.023∗∗∗ 0.412 0.023∗∗∗
log income 1992 0.773 0.047∗∗∗ 0.773 0.047∗∗∗
log random income 1992 0.369 0.057∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.182 0.021∗∗∗ -0.181 0.021∗∗∗ -0.207 0.022∗∗∗
being adopted -0.744 0.302∗∗∗ 1.836 2.227 2.055 2.265
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.251 0.216 -0.266 0.221
variance of years of education
individual component
intercept 1.201 0.025∗∗∗ 1.200 0.025∗∗∗ 1.202 0.025∗∗∗
daughter -0.199 0.034∗∗∗ -0.198 0.034∗∗∗ -0.175 0.036∗∗∗
being adopted 0.377 0.117∗∗∗ 0.334 0.116∗∗∗ 0.380 0.119∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.139 0.040∗∗∗ 0.139 0.040∗∗∗ 0.080 0.009∗∗∗
log income 1992 -0.065 0.039∗ -0.065 0.039∗
log random income 1992 0.059 0.066
number of siblings -0.115 0.038∗∗∗ -0.115 0.038∗∗∗ -0.122 0.037∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.505 -3.504 -3.535
N 3230 3230 3230
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀects 0.784 0.645
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
33Table 6: Education, nature and nurture eﬀects for sons and daughters
years of education of boys
intercept 6.154 0.927∗∗∗ 13.827 0.432∗∗∗
age -0.117 0.010∗∗∗ -0.119 0.010∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.368 0.032∗∗∗ 0.416 0.032∗∗∗
log income 1975 0.828 0.091∗∗∗
log random income 1975 0.270 0.099∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.151 0.030∗∗∗ -0.178 0.030∗∗∗
being adopted 1.513 2.239 1.209 2.359
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.202 0.218 -0.177 0.231
years of education of girls
intercept 5.746 0.890∗∗∗ 13.495 0.444∗∗∗
age -0.104 0.011∗∗∗ -0.106 0.011∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.363 0.032∗∗∗ 0.410 0.032∗∗∗
log income 1975 0.836 0.087∗∗∗
log random income 1975 0.297 0.098∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.202 0.032∗∗∗ -0.227 0.032∗∗∗
being adopted 2.760 4.203 3.117 4.006
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.347 0.407 -0.371 0.390
variance of years of education
boy component
intercept 1.043 0.029∗∗∗ 1.048 0.030∗∗∗
being adopted -0.237 0.498 -0.153 0.492
girl component
intercept 1.196 0.025∗∗∗ 1.198 0.025∗∗∗
being adopted 0.692 0.144∗∗∗ 0.684 0.150∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.118 0.041∗∗∗ 0.079 0.009∗∗∗
log income 1975 -0.056 0.046
log random income 1975 0.026 0.111
number of siblings -0.099 0.041∗∗∗ -0.120 0.038∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.516 -3.538
N 3230 3230
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀect sons 0.548 0.425
nature eﬀect daughters 0.955 0.904
likelihood ratio tests 7.429 6.201
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
34Table 6 continued: Education, nature and nurture eﬀects for sons and daughters
years of education of boys
intercept 4.788 0.777∗∗∗ 13.772 0.427∗∗∗
age -0.105 0.010∗∗∗ -0.116 0.010∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.309 0.032∗∗∗ 0.415 0.032∗∗∗
log income 1992 0.880 0.065∗∗∗
log random income 1992 0.454 0.077∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.155 0.029∗∗∗ -0.186 0.030∗∗∗
being adopted 0.810 2.205 0.784 2.343
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.137 0.214 -0.135 0.229
years of education of girls
intercept 6.696 0.784∗∗∗ 13.487 0.444∗∗∗
age -0.101 0.011∗∗∗ -0.106 0.011∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.330 0.032∗∗∗ 0.410 0.032∗∗∗
log income 1992 0.673 0.066∗∗∗
log random income 1992 0.295 0.077∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.210 0.031∗∗∗ -0.232 0.031∗∗∗
being adopted 2.644 3.970 3.141 3.946
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.337 0.385 -0.373 0.384
variance of years of education
boy component
intercept 1.006 0.029∗∗∗ 1.035 0.030∗∗∗
being adopted -0.215 0.449 -0.150 0.447
girl component
intercept 1.190 0.025∗∗∗ 1.193 0.026∗∗∗
being adopted 0.614 0.151∗∗∗ 0.672 0.153∗∗∗
family component
IQ of parent 0.136 0.041∗∗∗ 0.080 0.009∗∗∗
log income 1992 -0.062 0.041∗
log random income 1992 0.087 0.073
number of siblings -0.116 0.039∗∗∗ -0.124 0.038∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -3.503 -3.534
N 3230 3230
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀect sons 0.443 0.325
nature eﬀect daughters 1.021 0.909
likelihood ratio tests 11.175 8.075
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
35Table 7: Descriptive statistics of biological and adopted children
biological adopted
mean sd mean sd t test
individual characteristics
years of education 13.352 2.516 12.412 3.036 3.888
still in school (censored) 0.228 0.419 0.368 0.484 -3.483
gender (daughters) 0.478 0.499 0.464 0.500 0.278
age 26.376 5.005 23.790 5.540 5.395
family characteristics
number of siblings 2.341 1.346 1.815 0.991 4.129
IQ parent 10.049 1.401 10.467 1.487 -3.118
years of education father 13.387 2.525 14.377 2.810 -4.094
years of education mother 12.782 1.670 13.562 2.177 -4.834
log family income 1975 9.674 0.486 9.803 0.446 -2.795
log family income 1992 10.960 0.655 11.140 0.642 -2.895
number of observations 3116 114
Table 8: Adoption families and selection eﬀects: estimates of a logit model
simple model
intercept -5.025 0.631∗∗∗ -5.663 0.583∗∗∗ -5.446 1.714∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.195 0.060∗∗∗
education father 0.083 0.036∗∗
education mother 0.113 0.052∗∗
log income 1975 0.249 0.175
Pseudo R-square 0.008 0.018 0.001
full model
intercept -5.799 1.697 -5.825 1.430∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.093 0.066 0.095 0.067
education father 0.070 0.039∗ 0.071 0.039∗
education mother 0.102 0.053∗ 0.103 0.053∗
log income 1975 -0.051 0.181
log income 1992 -0.046 0.139
Pseudo R-square 0.019 0.020
N 3230 3230 3230
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
36Table 9: Education and nature and nurture eﬀects using all children in the full WLS sample
years of education
intercept 6.735 0.433∗∗∗ 13.873 0.218∗∗∗
daughter 0.173 0.040∗∗∗ 0.171 0.040∗∗∗
age -0.113 0.005∗∗∗ -0.116 0.005∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.326 0.014∗∗∗ 0.372 0.014∗∗∗
log income 1975 0.772 0.041∗∗∗
log random income 1975 0.301 0.045∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.161 0.012∗∗∗ -0.179 0.012∗∗∗
being adopted 1.768 0.745∗∗∗ 1.736 0.755∗∗∗
being adopted×IQ of parent -0.246 0.071∗∗∗ -0.239 0.071∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -1.774 -1.785
N 13626 13626
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀects 0.754 0.642
years of education
intercept 6.561 0.380∗∗∗ 13.886 0.217∗∗∗
daughter 0.174 0.039∗∗∗ 0.172 0.040∗∗∗
age -0.107 0.005∗∗∗ -0.115 0.005∗∗∗
IQ of parent 0.286 0.015∗∗∗ 0.370 0.014∗∗∗
log income 1992 0.722 0.031∗∗∗
log random income 1992 0.318 0.036∗∗∗
number of siblings -0.163 0.012∗∗∗ -0.184 0.012∗∗∗
being adopted 1.539 0.740∗∗∗ 1.599 0.754∗∗∗
IQ of parent×being adopted -0.225 0.070∗∗∗ -0.226 0.071∗∗∗
Mean loglikelihood -1.767 -1.783
N 13626 13626
genetic component in ability (bg1/b1)
nature eﬀects 0.786 0.611
Standard errors in italics; ∗ signiﬁcant at 10% level,∗∗ signiﬁcant at 5% level, et cetera
37